A few weeks ago the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the newly elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych signed an agreement according to which Russia will reduce by 30% the price of natural gas sold to Ukraine. In exchange, an extension of the lease of a base in the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Sevastopol, Crimea, will be granted to Russia. The Russian fleet has been there in its various historical evolutions since 1783, after the Russian annexation of Crimea. According to an agreement signed in 1997 the deadline for the end of the lease before the new agreement was set for 2017. Following the new accord the fleet will be allowed to stay in Sevastopol for 25 years after 2017 plus a 5 year renewal option. The agreement was smoothly passed by the Russian Duma on April 27, 2010. In Ukraine things did not go through so easily. Eggs were thrown and people got caught in fights in the middle of the ratification process. In the end, nevertheless, the agreement was ratified.
This is certainly an improvement in the relations between Russia and Ukraine. It was not too long ago, after all, that Putin refused to cooperate with Ukraine blaming its ‘criminal leadership’ for ‘turning off’ the gas supplies to Europe and for providing Georgia with weapons during the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008.
Does this mean that from now on all the problems between Russia and Ukraine are going to be magically solved? There is more than one reason to doubt it. The immaturity of the Ukrainian government and the reciprocal feelings of distrust that the two countries have nurtured have being the main obstacle in the past as they are in the present, and only by overcoming them the situation will see a real chance to improve.
Ukraine has been so far the main variable in determining relations between the two countries. While Russia has always remained quite firm in its positions, Ukraine’s recent history is a succession of bad choices and political naivety that have made of it an extremely unstable and unpredictable political partner. The corruption of the system, the populism of its political leaders, the tendency to sway from a pro-Russian to a pro-Western direction with extreme easiness are all problems that have tainted Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Russia has been struggling with getting adjusted to its new status of ex super-power quite for a while. Taking into account its vital economic dependency on Russian gas, Ukraine should have, therefore, avoided being too defiant towards a country that still considers relations with former USSR members extremely delicate and important. But Ukraine has being defiant many times already. Under Leonind Kravchuk it resisted the Russian pressure to preserve a common army and fleet souring relations. The situation seemed to take a turn for the worse when the president Kravchuk was replaced by Leonid Kuchma, who initially endorsed a pro-Western stance. When the Cassette Scandal, that saw the president involved in the killing of a journalist, was made public, however, Kuchma was left alone by the West and saw his last chance of survival in changing the vector in foreign policy towards a friendly relationship with Russia. He even referred to Russian as an ‘official language’. When he was finally obliged to release his position as a president, however, the situation became much more complicated. The Orange Revolution brought to power Viktor Yushchenko, following the discovery of illegal support given by the authorities to Viktor Yanukovych, the candidate closer to Russia, during elections. Putin condemned the event as a Western plot against Russia. An era of distrust and tension was in this way inaugurated. The more Ukraine conveyed its desire to grow close to the EU and NATO, the more Russia expressed negative remarks towards the Ukrainian leaders. The long-term economic partnership between Russia and Ukraine in the field of gas supplies (coming from Russia) and delivery to Europe (managed by Ukraine) became extremely chaotic. There were repeated crises in 2005-2006, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009, due to difficulties in negotiating the price for the gas transferred from Russia to Ukraine. The complete truth about these crises has not been found yet. The way in which the economic negotiations were and are lead is surrounded by mystery, with middlemen and companies with no assets involved. Corruption is certainly part of the picture, with Ukraine allegedly subtracting a part of the gas destined to Europe.
Since Viktor Yanukovych has become president in February 2010 things seem to be going slightly better. This is definitely to be attributed to the president himself, who has been so far able to keep a balanced relationship with both the West and Russia. And this is probably the secret for improving the situation in foreign policy: being neither pro or against Russia, but pro Ukraine’s interests. This is not enough, however, to improve the state of the political system overall. What Ukraine really needs is a new elite of politicians interested primarily in making of Ukraine a healthy and functioning system, able to take the initiative against corruption and the other problems that threaten its stability. It is ridiculous to say that Yanukovych belongs to this category of politicians, but he has certainly understood how to preserve good relations with Ukraine’s neighbours. And this gives him an edge over everyone else.
Aegroto, dum anima est, spes esse dicitur
